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COMMENT
APPORTIONMENT: PAST TO FUTURE
by John Dudis
INTRODUCTION
"Apportionment," in American political practice, may be defined
as the "determination by law of the number of representatives which
a state, county, or other political subdivision may send to a legislative
body."' "Reapportionment" is "a new apportionment of legislative seats
among states or other political units."'2 These definitions would appear
to be the principal pillars upon which our democracy is built; however,
apportionment and reapportionment have caused some of the greatest
political and judicial controversies of the last three decades. The causes
and reasons for malapportionment may be reduced to three main
rationales.3
The first is the shift that has taken place in the population of the
United States. Our country is no longer rural but urban in nature.
Because of malapportionment, the rural areas generally control the
power in the state legislative assemblies. 4 State legislatures have ex-
pressed, at best, reluctance and, at worst, outright hostility to the
suggestion that they surrender their power to the expanding urban
communities.
Second, political factors often come into operation. In most states,
rural areas are dominated by one political party, and the opposition
party controls the expanding urban centers. This factor alone is suf-
ficient to create a dispute over reapportionment. Another fear, some-
times more illusory than real, is that the urban communities, if given
the power, would neglect the interests of the rural population. A com-
mon fear of many rural dwellers is that the urban faction would "over
tax" and "under spend" to the detriment of the rural population.
The third and final factor for failure to reapportion is essentially
legal in nature. Most state constitutions were written before the "rural
to urban" shift in population had taken place; consequently these con-
stitutions usually require that each county, or other similar political
subdivision, be guaranteed at least one seat in one of the chambers
of the state legislature. As a state grows in population, more political
subdivisions are created out of the rural areas to offset the growing
power of the urban communities; therefore, malapportionment in favor
1SMITH, CONRAD AND ZURCHER, JOHNDS, DICTIONARY or AMERICAN POLITICS, 22 (1955).2Id. at 318.
'For an extensive study of the causes and reasons for malapportionment see, McKAY,
REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OP EQUAL REPRESENTATION, 49-54 (1965);
JEWELL, THE POLITICS OP REAPPORTIONMENT, 5-17 (1962).
4BONE, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, 62 (1965).
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of the rural areas rapidly increases.5 Some state constitutions also set
a maximum number of seats that can exist in one chamber at one time.
A state that possesses such a constitutional provision will quickly reach
a point at which malapportionment will be guaranteed because the
state constitution will not permit any new legislative seats to be created.
Since boundaries for political subdivisions within a state are drawn
by the state legislatures, one is able to understand the method by which
rural domination is perpetuated. 6
From what authority does the power to reapportion flow? The
Constitution of the United States provides for a decennial census on the
basis of which Congress apportions representatives to the states ac-
cording to population, although each state must have a minimum of
one representative.7 State constitutions and laws regulate the appor-
tionment of the various state legislatures." States have not solely con-
sidered population as the basis for their legislative apportionments.
States have also taken into consideration such elements as geography,
economy, history, and demography.9 Most states have followed the
example of the U.S. Constitution; consequently, one chamber was at
least partially apportioned according to population, and the other
chamber was apportioned on the basis of a geographical district. e.g.:
a county, borough, township, etc.
By the fall election of 1970, the voters of Montana authorized
the calling of a constitutional convention to draft a new constitution
5Montana is an excellent example of this proposition. In 1889 Montana had a total
of 16 counties. This number has been increased, and today Montana has a total of 56.
OSee, Bone, supra note 4: Three major techniques are employed by rural-dominated
state legislatures to gerrymander the congressional districts to favor rural voters.
one is to give urban areas significantly less representation than a rural representa-
tive. A second is the simple refusal to redistrict, so that as people move to the cities,
their vote counts less because the cities do not gain seats and the rural areas do not
lose seats according to the proportional changes in their populations. A third is to
create new districts but to make them all unequal in size and in shape in order to
to favor certain kinds of voters. A party majority may use this technique to con-
centrate opponent's strength in a few districts and to spread its own strength over
several districts.
"Gerrymandering" is the name given to excessive manipulation of the shape of
legislative or congressional districts. The gerrymander was named after Elbridge
Gerry, Governor of Massachusetts in 1812, when the legislature created a peculiar
salamander-shaped district to benefit the party to which Gerry belonged. The basic
intent of practically every gerrymander is political to create a maximum number of
districts which would elect the party candidates or types of candidates favored by
the controlling group in the legislature that does the redistricting. Congress and the
Nation, 1945-1964, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SE..VCE 1528 (1965).
7U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
'The Montana Constitution of 1889 provided that the Montana Senate would be com-
posed of a single senator from each county. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 4, art. VI,§ 4.
The Montana House of Representatives was to represent each county in proportion
to its population. MONT. CoNST. art. VI, §§ 2, 3, 6. A census and reapportionment
of the House was to take place every five years. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 4, art. VI,
§§ 2-6. For an interesting and informative article in this area of Montana constitu-
tional law see, Waldron, 100 Years of Reapportionment in Montana, 28 MONT. L. REV.
1-24 (1966).
'Controversy Over Supreme Court Decision on Apportionment of State -Legislation,
CONGRESSIONAL DIGEsT XVIV, 3 (1965).
[Vol. 33
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for the state. Toward that convention, this comment is being written
for two main purposes: first, to provide a brief history of the reappor-
tionment issue; second, to suggest a reapportionment plan.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY' REFUSAL
TO CONSIDER REAPPORTIONMENT
Prior to 1960, the courts had played only a negative-to-passive
role in reapportionment conflicts. Conflicts which were brought before
the courts were based almost exclusively upon violations of the appor-
tionment provision of the various state constitutions. The courts re-
stricted themselves to the examination of whether or not reapportion-
ment actions of this type came within the range of permissible legis-
lative discretion.1 0 Because of the policy of the courts, any action on
the part of a citizen to force a state legislature to reapportion itself
was doomed to failure.1
The Supreme Court of the United States also refused to consider
reapportionment questions on the grounds that such suits involved
"For an excellent summary of this particular reapportionment history, see, LAMB,
PIERCE, AND WHITE, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS THE MICH-
IGAN EXPERIENCE, 14-18 (1963). The authors of this work state at 17: "In enunciat-
ing these standards for determining the range of permissible legislative discretion,
the courts have carefully examined the provisions of the state constitution and have
repeatedly emphasized that in some respects the mandatory provisions conflict with
the requirement of equal population. Furthermore, they have almost universally
agreed that the motives of the legislature in enacting the particular apportionment
will not be examined in applying the standard. Finally, although expressing aware-
ness of the delicacy of the questions involved and of the respect due a coordinate
branch of government, state courts generally have not refused to decide the consti-
tutional issues. Various cases that illustrate this standard are: Baird v. Kings
County, 138 N.Y. 95, 112, 22 N.E. 827 (1893); Giddings v. Secretary of State, 93
Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892); People v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 482, 40 N.E. 307
(1895); State ex rel. Meighan v. Wetherill, 125 Minn. 336, 342, 147 N.W. 105 (1914);
State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 725 (1892); Pagland v. Anderson, 125
Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865, 869 (1907); Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d
315, 321 (1931); Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892); Attorney Gen-
eral v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581
(1916); Merrill v. Mitchell, 257 Mass. 184, 153 N.E. 562 (1926); and Rogers v.
Morgan, 127 Neb. 456, 256 N.W. 1 (1934).
LARSON, REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE COURTS, 15 (1962) states: "It is to be noted,
however, that the courts . . . were not intervening directly to strike down the evil
of unequal representation but were admonishing the legislatures that reapportionment
acts must be drawn within the bounds of constitutional limitations. While this un-
yielding judicial attitude toward reapportionment chicanery served effectively to
keep the legislatures from outrageous abuses in the exercise of their powers, it did
not provide a workable solution where the legislature had become a society of con-
nivance for the continuation of usurped political power through willful disregard of
constitutional directives to reapportion. Against the 'silent gerrymander' of legis-
lative inaction the courts could find no firm ground. .... .1
12a the leading case on this point, Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557, 46
A.L.R. 960 (1926), the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the petitioner's request
that a writ of mandamus be issued to order the state legislature to reapportion itself.
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"political questions.' 2 The first reapportionment case to reach the
Supreme Court was the famous case of Colegrove v. Green.13 Three per-
sons, who were qualified to vote in congressional districts of Illinois
having much larger populations than other congressional districts of
the state, brought a suit to restrain officers of the state from arrang-
ing an election in which members of Congress were to be chosen. The
complaint alleged that the congressional districts created by Illinois
law lacked compactness of territory and approximate equality of popu-
lation. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the lower court
on several grounds. First, the Court stated that the Federal Reappor-
tionment Act of June 18, 192914 stated no requirements "as to com-
pactness, contiguity and equality in population districts.' u5 This fact
alone was sufficient to justify a dismissal of the case. Second, the
Court stated:
The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the
popular House and left to that House determination whether States
have fulfilled their responsibility. If Congress failed in exercising
its powers, whereby standards of fairness are offended, the remedy
ultimately lies with the people. Whether Congress faithfully dis-
charges its duty or not, the subject has been committed to the ex-
clusive control of Congress."e
An interesting note is that a majority of the judges who took
part in this decision believed that the federal courts had the power
to determine whether an apportionment was constitutional. 17 The cases
"In the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 164-166, (1803) Chief
Justice Marshall stated in the majority opinion that the courts will not enter in
political questions even though such questions involve actual controversies. The non-
justiciability of a political question is founded primarily on the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers and the policy of judicial self-restraint. The relationship between
the judiciary and the other branches of the federal government gives rise to political
questions, and whether a matter has been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of the government is decided by the Court. For an excellent discussion of
this area see, C. A. WRIGHT, Law of Federal Courts, 45-48 (1970).
-328 U.S. 549 (1946).
146 Stat. 21 as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 2 (a).
"Colegrove v. Green, supra note 13 at 551.
"Colegrove v. Green, supra note 13 at 554. At 552 the court stated: "We are of
opinion that the appellants ask of this court what is beyond its competence to grant.
This is one of those demands on judicial power which cannot be met by verbal fencing
about 'jurisdiction.' It must be resolved by considerations on the basis of which
this Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene in controversies. It has refused
to do so because due regard for the effective working of our Government revealed this
issue to be of a pecularily political nature and therefore not meant for judicial deter-
ation. " I
17The 4-3 ruling of the case that no relief could be granted obscured an alignment which
stated that under certain circumstances matters such as this would be justiciable
Justice Rutledge concurred with Justice Frankfurter, Justice Reed and Justice Burton
in the dismissal of the action; but the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge agrees
with the dissenting opinions of Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy that political ques-
tions should not exclude reapportionment questions from judicial interpretation.
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that followed the Colegrove decision were equally unsuccessful in ob-
taining a change in state apportionment laws, with the Supreme Court
utilizing a variety of grounds to reach such results.'8
Two reapportionment cases that were litigated after Colegrove v.
Green deserve mention. The first is Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe. 19
Under the congressional act that established the Hawaiian Territory,
the territorial legislature was to reapportion itself as was necessary to
maintain its representative character. For a period of fifty-five years
the legislature did not reapportion itself; consequently, a suit was
brought. 20 The district court retained jurisdiction and was highly crit-
ical of the injustice that was being accomplished by the failure to re-
apportion the legislature of the Territory of Hawaii. The court dis-
tinguished the Colegrove decision on the grounds that Hawaii was a ter-
ritory and as such did not come under the state-national government
relationship. As a territory Hawaii was merely a nonstate political
subdivision of the United States. The court stated:
We are not saying each citizen must always have the same vote.Political institutions may invoke geographic representation. How-
ever, where the fundamental law provides for equal rights of
suffrage each citizen should have the right of judicial redress if
the law is violated. Otherwise his rights under the law can be dis-
regarded with impunity, as indeed they now are in Hawaii and many
states."
Before any further action could be taken, the United States Congress
amended the act that established the Territory of Hawaii, established
new legislative districts, and placed the responsibility of reapportion-
ment on the Governor. The importance of this decision is obvious.
Federal courts would retain jurisdiction of reapportionment suits and
would act if necessary to insure that each citizen was granted an equal
vote in selecting members of the legislative assemblies. 22
The second case to consider is the Minnesota case of Magraw v.
Donovan.23 In this case citizens and voters of Minnesota brought an
action to have the 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act de-
clared invalid and to have state officers enjoined from operating the
election machinery at future elections. By 1957 Minnesota had been
without a reapportionment since 1913, and during that time the popula-
uSee Wright, supra note 12 at 47, n. 17, e.g., Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (per
curiam) (want of a substantial federal question); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276(1950) (want of equity); Colegrove v. Barret, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (per curiam)
(want of equity). Only in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) was relief
granted. In Gomillion the plaintiffs complained of affirmative legislation action that
deprived them of their vote. The decision was based on discriminatory treatment of
a racial minority which violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
"138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1956).
wOId.
2id. at 236.
"The precedent set forth in the Dyer case was refuted by the State of Alabama in Perry
v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
1163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
1971]
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tion had increased within the state by 43.7 per cent. The difference in
voting power between the smallest and largest legislative district was
inequitably distributed.24 The court stated:
Here it is the unmistakable duty of the State Legislature to
reapportion itself periodically in accordance with recent population
changes.... Early in January of 1959 the 61st Session of the Minne-
sota Legislature will convene, all of the members of which will be
newly elected on November 4th of this year. . . . It is not to be
presumed that the legislature will refuse to take such action as is
necessary to comply with its duty under the State Constitution.
We defer decision on all the issues presented (including that of the
power of the Court to grant relief), in order to afford the Legisla-
ture full opportunity to "heed the constitutional mandate to re-
district."'
The Minnesota case, like the one in Hawaii, became moot because the
new Minnesota Legislature reapportioned itself without the court hav-
ing to take any further action.
Both of these cases illustrate that the opinion of the courts in the
19 5 0's and the early 1960's was that they had the power to force re-
apportionment. That opinion was affirmed in the landmark decision of
Baker v. Carr.
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT OF THE STATES AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: BAKER V. CARR
Noting the extension of the United States Constitution during the
1950's and the 1960's to greater protection of individual rights, it is
the more remarkable that the issue of reapportionment did not come
to the front sooner:
By 1960, every legislative body in every single state had at least
a 2-1 popularity disparity between the most and least heavily popu-
lated districts. Studies of the effective vote of large and small
counties in state legislatures between 1910 and 1960 showed that
the effective vote of the large counties had slipped while their
percentage of the national population had more than doubled.
The most lightly populated counties advanced from a position of
slight over-representation to one of extreme over-representation,
holding almost twice as many seats as population alone would entitle
them to. Predictably, the rural-dominated state legislatures resisted
every move toward reapportioning districts to reflect new popula-
tion centers."
These factors were present in the State of Tennessee, and for over
half a century, the legislature of the state had utterly refrained from
reapportioning itself. The Tennessee Constitution guaranteed each qual-
ified voter an equal vote and provided for a system of representation
in both houses of the state legislature proportional to voting population
21Id. at 186.
21ld. at 187. According to Reapportionment and the Courts, supra note 10 at 27, "Voter
equality was guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution; relief had been denied in the
state courts; the remedy sought did not project the court into the legislative arena;
nor would a declaration of unconstitutionality of the existing apportionment statutes
paralyze the state government." These were perhaps the reasons for the court decision.
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of the counties and the districts of the state. This equality of voters
was to be maintained by a decennial census, and the legislature was to
reapportion itself according to this census. The last reapportionment
of the legislature had taken place under a 1901 reapportionment, and
since 1901 the population of Tennessee had shifted to such an extent
that about one-third of the total voters had the power to elect and con-
trol two-thirds of the members of the state legislature.27 All efforts
to secure a new apportionment that would be in line with the population
shift had met with failure.2 8 The Tennessee legislature completely re-
fused to reapportion itself, and no referendum or initiative laws existed
in the state to compel reapportionment.
29
The urban interests of Tennessee brought a suit in the state courts
to force reapportionment; this suit was rejected, however, on the
grounds that state courts should stay out of legislative matters. The
urban complainants then appealed to the federal courts asking for relief.
They charged that there was a "debasement of their votes by virtue of
the incorrect, obsolete and unconstitutional apportionment."30 A three-
judge federal court in Tennessee dismissed the case on February 4, 1960,
citing the Colegrove v. Green decision as controlling precedent.8 ' In
March of 1961 the U.S. Justice Department intervened in the case by
filing as an "amicus curiae." The Justice Department pointed out to the
court that many states had not reapportioned themselves for over 50
years; consequently, the only realistic remedy to rectify the situation
would be federal judicial action.3 2
On March 26, 1962, the Supreme Court by a 6-2 decision ruled in
favor of the urban population of Tennessee. Mr. Justice William J. Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, emphasized that the federal judiciary had
the power to review the apportionment of state legislatures under the
14th Amendment equal protection clause. Justice Brennan specifically
stated: "The mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right
does not mean it presents a political question." 33 The Court disting-
uished the case of Colegrove v. Green:
'For a discussion of the population shifts that had taken place in Tennessee from
1901 to 1962 see, McKay, supra note 3 at 71 and Larson, supra note 10 at 29.
"Id. All past efforts in the legislature to secure new apportionment legislation had
failed. Morevorer, resort to constitutional amendment as a method of reform was
found to be impossible by virtue of the stringent procedures for amending the Ten-
nessee Constitution, procedures which for years had safeguarded that document as
the oldest (1870) unamended constitution in the nation. Similarly, reform through
a constitutional convention seemed unworkable. Only one constitutional convention
had been called, and that in 1952. This convention was a so-called limited convention
in that only a limited number of constitutional provisions were to be taken up for
consideration by the convention. Legislative representation was not among the sub-
jects included on the convention's agenda.
"Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, supra note 26.
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 186 (1962). The Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States reads, in part: "No state . . . shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.''
"179 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Tenn. 1959).
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The appellees refer to Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, as auth-
ority that the District Court lacked jurisdiction on the subject
matter. Appellees misconceive the holding of that case. The holding
was precisely contrary to their reading of it. Seven members of the
Court participated in the decision. Unlike many other cases in this
field which have assumed without discussion that there was jurisdic-
tion, all three opinions filed in Colegrove discussed the question.
Two of the opinions expressing the views of four of the Justices,
a majority, flatly held that there was jurisdiction of the subject
matter."
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that the majority
had misinterpreted the facts of the case, and he contended that relief
for malapportionment should be obtained from the electorate of the
State of Tennessee and not in the courts.35
According to one analyst, the decision of Baker v. Carr posed five
major questions:
(1) Is the suit within the jurisdiction of the federal courts?
(2) Is the issue "justiciable," that is, is it a controversy which
is of a type which can be properly settled by judicial action?
(3) Do the facts establish a denial of equal protection? (4) What
standards of apportionment are dictated by the equal protection
principle? (5) What remedies may courts grant?
The Court chose to decide only the first two issues, and then re-
manded the case to the trial court. Hence the case left standing
more issues than it settled."
The major unresolved questions that Baker v. Carr did not answer
posed serious problems for the lower courts. How seriously malappor-
tioned must a legislature be to violate the 14th Amendment? Would a
"little federal system," with one house apportioned by population and
the other by factors such as geography be constitutionally acceptable?
Would state constitutions be overridden to enforce the 14th Amend-
ment's guarantees of equal protection! Would the presence of initiative
and referendum laws, or the fact that an apportionment plan had been
so approved, affect constitutionality? How would a court order be en-
forced? Despite the confusion, countless suits were filed and numer-
ous lower courts undertook to interpret Baker v. Carr. Rarely in U.S.
history had a single decision had such an immediate and far-reaching im-
pact. Litigation immediately took place in almost every state in the
union.3 7
"Id. at 202.
"Id. at 267-270. Justice Frankfurter stated: "A hypothetical claim resting on ab-
stract assumptions is now for the first time made the basis for affording illusory
relief for a particular evil even though it foreshadows deeper and more pervasive
difficulties in consequence. The claim is hypothetical and the assumptions are abstract
because the Court does not vouchsafe the lower courts--state and federal-guidelines
for formulating specific, definite, wholly unprecedented remedies for the inevitable
litigations that today's umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in connection
with politically motivated reapportionments in so many states. In such a setting to
promulgate jurisdiction in the abstract is meaningless."I
"HAMILTON, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT: KEY TO PowxR, 32-33 (1964).
8'Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, supra note 26. According to the NEw YORK
TIMES, October 21, 1962, p. 71, Col. 1: ''70 cases were in the process of litigation
in 33 states of the union. 39 of these were in state courts, and 31 cases were in
federal courts. ' '
[Vol. 33
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The major questions raised by Baker v. Carr were answered on
June 15, 1964, when the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a decision in six
reapportionate cases. 38 The leading case of Reynolds v. Sims was litiga-
tion concerning the malapportionment of the Alabama Legislature. From
this series of cases seven basic principles for reapportionment of state
legislatures can be gleaned: First, the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution requires "with respect to the allo-
cation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State,
stand in the same relation regardless of where they live.' '3 9 The second
principle of reapportionment that these cases held is that:
... as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legis-
lature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated,
an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.'
The third principle is that a "little federal system" with one house ap-
portioned by population and the other by facts such as geography is
not constitutionally acceptable. 41 The fourth principle brought out by
this series of cases is that "mathematical exactness of precision" 42 in
carrying out legislative districts might be impossible, but that appor-
tionment must be "based substantially on population. '4  The fifth
principle set forth in these cases was that reapportionment of a state
legislature is constitutionally required with each 10-year national cen-
"Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. 44th General Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). The Supreme Court on June 22, 1964,
using the above-mentioned cases as precedent, invalidated reapportionment plans of
nine other states. Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 533 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378
U.S. 554 (1964); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S.
558 (1964); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S.
561 (1964); Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S.
364 (1964); Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964).
"Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 38 at 565. At 562 the Court stated: "Legislators rep-
resent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or
cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government
elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legis-
lators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. It could
hardly be gainsaid that a constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that
certain otherwise qualified voters had been entirely prohibited from voting for mem-
bers of their state legislature.''
"Id. at 568.11d. at 573: ". . . the federal analogy [is] inapposite and irrelevant to state legis-
lative districting schemes. Attempted reliance on the federal analogy appears often
to be little more than an after-the-fact rationalization offered in defense of mal-
adjusted state apportionment arrangements . . . . And the Founding Fathers clearly
had no intention of establishing a pattern or model for the apportionment of seats
in state legislature when the system of representation in the Federal Congress was
adopted. " IOId. at 577.
OId. at 572. The Court indicated that a good faith effort on the part of a state would
be considered to be constitutionally acceptable.
1971]
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sus.4 4 The sixth principle brought out by the Court was that an election
should be prevented from taking place under an unconstitutional ap-
portionment plan; however:
In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled
to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election
and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should
act and rely upon general equitable principles."
The seventh and final principle the Court enunciated was that if
the citizens of a state, through referendum or initiative laws, had ap-
proved an apportionment plan based on any other principle than popu-
lation, it would be unconstitutional because a "citizen's constitutional
rights can hardly be infringed upon because a majority of the people
choose to do so. ' '4 7 These principles are basic considerations which any
state must account for in developing any type of reapportionment plan,
and any reapportionment plan that does not comply with these basic
guidelines will be declared unconstitutional.
Several states, especially those located in the South, used what was
known as the "County Unit Voting System." In essence this system
divided the counties of a state into miniature electorates; and as a can-
mdidate ran for a state office he was given the "electoral" votes of each
county in which he won the popular vote. This system allowed a can-
didate to win tic popular vote in a given election but still lose the
election because the candidate failed to obtain a sufficient number of
"county unit votes." On March 18, 1963, in the case of Gray v. Sanders4s
the Supreme Court of the United States found that the "unit voting
system" of Georgia was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause to the 14th Amendment.49 Although Gray v- Sanders
was not a reapportionment case per se, the Court did indicate that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was going to be in-
terpreted in the future as meaning "one man, one vote."
Apportionment problems also came into existence in regard to U.S.
Congressional Districts. On February 17, 1964, in the case of Wesberry
v. Sanders,50 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that congressional districts
"Id. at 583-584, the Court stated: "In substance, we do not regard the Equal Pro-
tection Clause as requiring daily, monthly, annual, or biennial reapportionment so
long as a State has a reasonably conceived plan for periodic readjustment of legisla-
tive representation. While we do not intend to indicate that decennial reapportion-
ment is a constitutional requisite, compliance with such an approach would clearly
meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of leg-
islative representation. And we do not mean to intimate that more frequent reappor-
tionment would not be constitutionally permissible or practicably desirable. But if




'TLucas v. 44th General Assembly, smpra note 38 at 736-737.
"372 U.S. 368 (1963).
41Id. at 381, the Court stated: "The conception of political equality from the Declara-
tion of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Sixteenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing---one person, one vote."
-376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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would have to be as equal in population as possible. 51 That case relied
upon Baker v. Carr to support the contention that this type of districting
question is justiciable and upon Gray v. Sanders to establish the principle
that one man, one vote is applicable to national congressional elections
as well as state legislative elections.
THE STATES FIGHT BACK: THE DIRKSEN AMENDMENT 52
By late summer of 1964, the reapportionment decisions of the
Supreme Court were subjected to a great deal of criticism. The Republi-
can National Convention in San Francisco adopted a platform plank
urging an amendment to the Constitution in order to allow the indivi-
dual states to base at least one house of their state legislature on a
basis of an element other than population. Senator Everrett Dirksen
(R.-Ill.) introduced a bill that would have placed a two-year mora-
torium on reapportionment legislation in most states, and this was at-
tached as a "rider" to the foreign aid bill that was presently before
the U.S. Congress. This "rider" was later striken by a Conference Report;
however, the threat of this type of congressional action forced the re-
apportionment forces in Congress to unite. Support for a constitutional
amendment was growing, and by the end of 1964, the United States
Congress began to feel the impact of this growing popular demand.58
The attack of these anti-reapportionment forces was based on the con-
cept that the states had the right to select through the initiative and
referendum the type of state legislatures that were to exist in the indivi-
dual states. These forces also demanded that Congress call a Constitu-
tional Convention under Article V of the U.S. Constitution. Petitions
by two-thirds of the states would require Congress to call this national
convention for the purpose of considering proposed amendments. The
strategy of the anti-reapportionment forces was built on the theory that
Congress would be forced to amend the Constitution on its own initi-
ative, by a two-thirds vote of each house, or else be faced with the un-
certain prospect of calling a Constitutional Convention. As the anti-
reapportionment forces gained support, the pro-reapportionment forces
'Id. at 8-9, the Court stated: "To say that a vote is worth more in one district than
another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic govern-
ment, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected 'by the
people,' a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional
Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to
the adopting of Art. I, § 2, reveals that those who framed the Constitution meant
that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts,
it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Represetatives."
Id. at 18, the Court stated: "While it may not be possible to draw congressional dis-
tricts with mathematical precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's
plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the funda-
mental goal for the House of Representatives."
"For a concise and short summary of the attempts to limit the reapportionment de-
decisions of the Supreme Court see, Hanson The Politics and Semantics of Constitu-
tionalism POLITICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
82-102 (1966).
5Sueh organizations as the American Farm Bureau Federation and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States favored a Constitutional Amendment to limit the
decisions that were rendered in the reapportionment cases.
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shifted their plan of attack into high gear. 4 The basic strategy of the
pro-reapportionment forces was to delay because as time passed more
and more state legislatures would be forced to reapportion by court
action. As the make-up of legislatures changed, the pro-reapportionment
forces would gain support.
In January of 1965, Senator Dirksen proposed an amendment that
provided for "the right and power to determine the composition of the
legislature of a state and the apportionment of the membership thereof
shall remain in the people of that state." Secondly, this proposed amend-
ment provided for the use of "factors other than population" in deter-
mining the composition of a state legislature. Finally, Dirksen's pro-
posal provided for the use of a state referendum for determining what
factors were to be used to select the composition of a state legislature.5"
This proposed amendment was referred to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee for consideration. Because of other business the committee was un-
able to consider it until March of 1965. The hearings of this committee
allowed "pro" and "anti" reapportionment elements to dispute the
issue. The proposal finally reached the Senate floor where Senator
Tydings (D.-Maryland) gave an eloquent speech against the Dirksen
amendment. 56 By June of 1965, the tide of popular support in the coun-
try had turned n.gainst the amendment. After political maneuvering on
both sides of the aisle, the Dirksen Amendment went down in defeat by
a vote of 57-39.57
"Such organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans for Democratic
Action, Conference of Mayors, Maryland Reapportionment Movement, and Senator
Paul Douglas (D.-Ill.) favored the strict and speedy enforcement of the Reapportion-
ment Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
IES. J. Res. 44, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964). Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) also
introduced two versions of the same amendment, S.J. Res. 37 and S.J. Res. 38.
"U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 11848-61. Senator Tydings' objections to the amend-
ment were as follows:
1. The first sentence eliminated judicial review by the courts. (i.e. the right and
power to determine the composition of the legislature of a state and the apportion-
ment of the membership thereof shall remain in the people of that State.
2. The vagueness of "other factors" would allow discrimination against Negroes
and other minorities.
3. The right of representation should not be submitted to a referendum.
4. Even if it should be submitted, the Dirksen Amendment made no provision for
subsequent review by the people thus freezing a malapportionment for all times.
5. Such an amendment should not be referred to the legislatures with a vested in-
terest in continuing malapportionment, but to convention.
6. There was no historical basis for the Dirksen assumption that one house of a
legislature should be based on factors other than population.
"U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD 18660.
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WHAT SOLUTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO ENABLE A STATE
TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
TO REAPPORTION?
58
The first solution to the reapportionment problem is for the indivi-
dual state legislatures to reapportion themselves. 59 Most states, however,
are reapportioned under a combination of judicial-legislative action.
Either the legislature fails to reapportion and a suit is brought to compel
reapportionment; or a legislature reapportions, and a suit is brought to
test the constitutionality of the reapportionment.
Legislative action has been one of the most satisfactory methods of
reapportionment because a legislature is able to consider, to a limited
extent at least, historical, economic, geographic, and demographic trends
existing within a state. The legislature, however, must reapportion
itself within the numerous constitutional guidelines the U.S. Supreme
Court has set forth in the various reapportionment casees. Legislative
reapportionment, however, does have several significant drawbacks.
Partisan politics and various interest groups often have conflicting ideals
as to what the new apportionment should be. Legislators, who are also
politicians, do not want to dilute the strength of their party, and legis-
lators do not wish to combine their personal district with the district
of another. After reapportionment some incumbent legislators are forced
to run against other incumbent legislators of the same party because the
reapportionment has combined their two districts. At any rate, over
half of the states in the nation have attempted to comply with the re-
apportionment mandate of the Supreme Court by reapportioning through
legislative action.60
A second "method" by which a state can be reapportioned is for
the state legislature to do nothing or at best be unable to agree on what
form of reapportionment the state should follow. In cases such as this,
the federal courts or the supreme court of the individual state will draw
I'For an excellent study of the apportionment plans of the various states, see, Appor-
tionment in the Nineteen Sixties: State legislatures and Congressional Districts by
the National Municipal League (August 1967, revised November 1970).
59Id. California, CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 6; Idaho, IDAHO REv. STAT. 67-204; Indiana,
IND. CONST. art. 4, § 5; Kansas, KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 2; Maine, ME. CoNST. art. IV,
pt. 1, § 1; Maryland, MD. CONST. art. III, § 2 et seq.; Minnesota, MINN. CONST.
art. IV, § 2; Mississippi, MISS. CONST. Ch. 15, Title 2, § 3326; Nebraska, N52.
CONST. art. III, § 5; Nevada, NEv. CONST. art. IV, § 5; North Carolina, N.C. CONST.
art. II, § 3 et seq.; South Dakota, S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; Tennessee, TENN. CONST.
art. II, § 5-6; Texas, TEX. CONST. art. III, § 25 et seq.; Virginia VA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 43; Washington, WASH. CONST. art. II, §2-3; West Virginia, W.VA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 7; Connecticut, CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6; Delaware, DEL. CONST. art. II § 2-2a;
Utah, UTAH CONST. art. IX, § 1-4; Vermont, VT. CONST. Ch. 2, § 18; Georgia, GA.
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up the necessary reapportionment plan.0 1 This method's disadvantage is
that the courts do not usually consider any other factors except popula-
tion in drawing up a reapportionment plan; consequently, districts,
counties, townships, boroughs, and other political subdivisions are often
indiscriminately combined in order to achieve a fair reapportionment.
One must also consider the various advantages this method possesses.
First, a scrupulously fair reapportionment is obtained. Second, political
fighting and bipartisan politics are completely removed from the reap-
portionment environment of the judiciary. Judicial reapportionment
is usually frowned on by state legislatures because legislators consider
reapportionment to be an issue that is to be reserved solely for their
judgments. Legislatures do not "interfere" with the matters of the
judiciary; therefore, the judiciary should not "interfere" with legisla-
tive reapportionment matters. Often the mere threat of judicial inter-
vention is a sufficient stimulus to force a legislature to reapportion
itself.6 2
A third method that is used to comply with the reapportionment re-
quirements of the U.S. Constitution is to call a state constitutional con-
vention or at least to propose a state constitutional amendment.6 3 States
have many problems with this type of procedure. How does a state se-
lect delegates for this convention? How does the state insure these dele-
gates represent all of the various interest groups within a state? What
is the scope of the convention to be? Is the convention merely to draw
up amendments to the present constitution? All constitutional conven-
tions are faced with the following problems: political fighting, biparti-
san politics, drafting proposals, excessive lobbying, restrictive compro-
mises, etc. A malapportioned constitutional convention's acts will also
have the problem of questionable constitutionality, in light of the vari-
ous U.S. Supreme Court decisions in regard to reapportionment. One
must not rule out the possibility that where constitutional amendments
and new constitutions are submitted to the voters of a state for ratifica-
tion, the citizens of the state may reject the proposals. For these reasons,
constitutional conventions and constitutional amendments are not the
most popular methods of satisfying the reapportionment requirements of
MId. For example: Arizona: Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F. Supp. 537 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Arkansas: Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, 246 S.W.2d 556, 220 Ark. 145 (1952);
Florida: In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 150 So.2d 721 (1963); Hawaii:
Burns, Governor of Hawaii v. Richardson et al., 386 U.S. 73 (1966); New York:
Orans v. Rockefeller, 265 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1965); Louisiana: Le Dourx v. Parish
Democratic Executive Committee of St. Landry Parish, 156 So.2d 48, 244 La. 901
(1963); Wisconsin: State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 126 N.W.2d 551, 22
Wis.2d 544 (1964).
6id. The discussion of California provides an excellent illustration of the point.
63Id. Iowa, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 33-35; Hawaii, HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 4;
New Jersey, N.J. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, par. 1; Rhode Island, R.I. CONST. amend. 19;
Pennsylvania, PENN. CONST. art. 2, § 17; Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. V. § 48; Massa-
chusetts, MASS. CONST. art. XXI, § 123; New Hampshire, N.H. CoNST. art. IX, pt. 2;
Missouri, Mo. CONST. art. III, § 2. This list is not exclusive because states often use
constitutional amendment and constitutional conventions in conjunction with legis-
lative and judicial action.
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the U.S. Constitution. On the other hand, the advantages of this method
are obvious. The state is able to forget any malapportionment problems
that existed in the past, and the convention is able to write a new con-
stitution without having to worry about previous state constitutional
mandates. No one really knows how to deal with the problems that are
inherent in a constitutional convention, but recognizing that these prob-
lems do exist enables one to avoid the pitfalls.
A fourth method of complying with the Supreme Court require-
ments of apportionment is to organize a Reapportionment Commission. 4
Under this mode, the Commission draws up the reapportionment plan
for the state. The plan may either be mandatory for a state to accept,
or the plan may be merely advisory in that the legislature, courts, or
voters of the state will have to enact the proposed plan into law. This
method has met with some success in that a fair reapportionment plan
is usually obtained, and a small group of men seem to be able to reach
compromises and obtain equitable results much quicker than a legis-
lative assembly. The reapportionment commission is also able to meet
during the legislative assembly term, and the state is not faced with
the unhappy prospect of a paralyzed state government while the legis-
lative assembly attempts to reapportion itself. A state is still faced with
the problem of selecting members for the reapportionment commis-
sion, and often partisan politics will come into play just as quickly
on a reapportionment commission as it will in the legislative assembly.
Upon failure of any of these plans, the judiciary may prohibit a
state legislature from enacting any laws until an equitable reapportion-
ment solution is found.5 The judiciary may also require that the next
legislative election be held "at large." 6 Although this usually provides
for an equitably apportioned legislature, the problems with an "at large"
election are enormous. Instead of running in a county or other political
subdivision, a state legislator must run on a state-wide ballot. This
not only increases the time and money involved in a poltical campaign,
but the voter is usually thoroughly confused by the mass of names from
which he is required to select his legislative representatives.
"Id. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1 et seq.; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, par. 1. This list is
not exclusive because states often use reapportionment commissions in conjunction
with constitutional, legislative and judicial action.
OId. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 2-3; VT. CONST. Ch. 2, § 18; CoNN. CONST. art. III, § 6.
OId. This occurred in Illinois in 1964.
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In 1965, on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in regard
to reapportionment, 8 Mrs. Phoebe Herweg, a citizen of Butte, brought
a suit in federal district court to compel reapportionment. 9 The fed-
eral district court retained jurisdiction, but refrained from granting
relief pending action by the 39th Legislative Assembly to reapportion
itself. Although several bills were introduced, the Montana Legislature
failed to reapportion itself, and in August of 1965, the federal district
court under its continuing jurisdiction reapportioned the Montana Legis-
lature. This has been the reapportioned form of the Montana Legis-
lature; it is the present form of the Montana legislature.70 The federal
district court also reapportioned Montana's two congressional districts
as required by the Supreme Court of the United States.7 1
When the 42nd Montana Legislature convened on January 4, 1971,
the state was faced with a financial crisis; consequently, although the
legislators knew that reapportionment was mandatory, financial affairs
of the state took precedence over reapportionment. Three House Bills
were introduced in the Montana House of Representatives. The first
bill, House Bill No. 502, was introduced by Representatives Towe and
T. L. Murphy.7 2 This bill provided for 80 single-member legislative dis-
tricts and 40 single-member senate districts, and the electors of a senate
district were provided with the option of selecting two House members-
at-large instead of voting for each House member in a single-district
rFor an excellent article dealing with reapportionment in Montana see, Waldron, supra
note 7. Professor Waldron also discussed Montana Reapportionment in Apportionment
in the Nineteen Sixties, Id.
"Id. Waldron states: "In 1889 Montana became the first state expressly to establish
a legislature on the federal analogy; the constitution decreed that its senate would
have one senator per county. Sixteen counties became 56 by 1925; yet population
growth slackened abruptly and people moved to the cities after World War I. Mean-
while, the assembly had given each county one representative as well, so that by 1961
only 38 of 94 representatives were allocated by a population formula. Decennial re-
apportionment by legislative action deepened malrepresentation."'
'Herweg v. 39th Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965). Apportion-
ment in the Nineteen Sixties, supra note 58. "Until November 1966, the state con-
stitution prohibited subdivision of counties in legislative districting. (art. VI, § 3
of the Montana Constitution states: Representative districts may be altered from time
to time as public convenience may require. When a representative district shall be
composed of two or more counties, they shall be contiguous, and the districts as
compact as may be. No county shall be divided in the formation of representative
districts.) Observing this requirement, the court shifted the legislature mostly single-
member to predominantly multi-member districts .... The 1965 assembly proposed
a constitutional amendment which was approved by the people in November 1966.
While deleting constitutional provisions incompatible with the reapportionment cases,
this amendment also permits the legislature to subdivide counties and to return to
single-member districts. The amendment contains a wistful anticipation that the
Dirksen amendment might permit return of the senate to one senator per county.
The federal court refused a petition to enjoin vote on its ratification, declaring that
the effect of this provision was speculative."
70REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 43-106.1 and 43-106.2 (1947). [Hereinafter cited as
R.C.M. 1947].
"Roberts v. Babcock, 246 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mont. 1965).
Thomas E. Towe (Dem.-Yellowstone County) and Terry L. Murphy (Dem.-Jefferson
County).
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manner.73 This bill was killed in the Legislative Reapportionment Com-
mittee on February 10, 1971. 71
The second bill, which was House Bill No. 601, was introduced by
Representatives Gunderson, Towe, Swanberg, Line, and T. L. Murphy.75
This bill would have established a bipartisan apportionment commission
to be created after each federal census for the purpose of studying the
feasibility of dividing the Montana Legislature into single-member dis-
tricts. This commission was to report its findings to the next state legs-
lative assembly for the lawmakers consideration. The commission was
to be composed of the leaders of the majority and minority parties in
each chamber of the legislature, and these members of the commission
were to select a non-office-holding citizen of Montana for a neutral
chairman. This bill was killed on the second reading on March 1, 1971.
The third bill to be introduced in the House was Bill No. 552 and
was the report of the Legislative Reapportionment Committee. The
original bill provided for a Senate of 42 members and a House of 85
members; however, this division was not acceptable, and on February
7, 1971, the Reapportionment Committee submitted a revised version
of Bill No. 552. The new revision provided for a Senate of 45 members
and a House of Representatives composed of 88 members. This revision
also contained a provision that enabled the legislative districts to divide
multi-member districts into single-member districts. 76 This new revision
was not acceptable; consequently, on February 12, 1971, the Reappor-
"The difference between ''single-member' and ''multi-member'' districts is that a
single-member district is one in which one legislator is elected from the entire district.
Multi-member districts provided for several legislators to be elected by the voters
from that district. According to Waldron, supra note 8 at 21-22: "Single-member
districts are commonly said to permit better representation of local minorities, more
knowledgeable voting because of the short ballot, and more responsible relations be-
tween the legislator and his constituents. Multi-member districts are supposed to
place less emphasis on parochial interests of the locality, to strengthen the party
responsibility required to achieve the large objectives of a political system, and reduce
opportunities for gerrymanderer partisan advantage."
"The members of the House Reapportionment Committee of the 42nd Montana
Legislative Assembly are: Chairman Harrison G. Fagg (Rep.-Yellowstone County),
Vice-Chairman William R. "Lefty" Campbell (Rep.-Missoula County), L. M. Larry
Aber (Rep.-Stillwater County), Robert A. Ellerd (Rep.-Gallatin County), Jack Gunder-
son (Dem.-Cascade County), Albert E. Kosena (Dem.-Deer Lodge County), Conrad F.
Lundgren (Rep.-Flathead County), Hershel M. Robbins (Dem.-Musselshell County),
and A. A. Zody (Dem.-Dawson County).
"Jack Gunderson (Dem.-Cascade County), Thomas E. Towe (Dem.-Yellowstone County),
Terry L. Murphy (Dem.-Jefferson County), Gorham E. Swanberg (Dem.-Cascade
County), and Orphey "Bounty" Lien (Dem.-Roosevelt County).
"See supra note 73, and § 3 of H.R. Bill No. 552 which states: '' Multi-member districts
may be divided into single-member districts under the following conditions: (a) A
petition representing eight percent (8%) of the registered voters of a multi-member
district has been submitted to the county clerk and recorder of each county, or por-
tion of a county in the district; (b) The county commissioners of each county which,
in part or whole, consists of a portion of a multi-member district shall establish a
time of election; (c) A majority of the registered voters of the district so orders;
(d) The plan of single-member districts shall be effective upon the approval of the
majority of the county commissioners of each county which, in part or whole, consists
of a portion of the multi-member district; (e) Single-member districts shall be as
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tionment Committee submitted a second revision. This revision provided
for a Senate of 45 members and a House of 89 members, and retained
with some slight modification the provisions for a division of multi-
member districts into single-member districts. This revision was not
acceptable. On February 13, 1971, the Reapportionment Committee sub-
mitted a third revised version of Bill No. 552. The Senate was to be
composed of 45 members and the House was to be composed of 89
members. The multi-member districts to single-member districts pro-
visions were retained; however, the new revision separated Deer Lodge
County from Jefferson, Powell and Granite Counties. This would have
enabled Deer Lodge County to have a completely separate Senate seat.
This revision was amended on February 27, 1971, by the Senate Com-
mittee of Reapportionment. The amendment increased the membership
of the Senate from 45 to 56. When the 42nd Legislative Assembly ad-
journed its regular session on March 4, 1971, House Bill No. 552 died
in a conference committee.
During the regular session of the legislature three joint house and
senate resolutions were introduced to the legislature. The first of these
resolutions was Joint Resolution No. 47 and was introduced by legis-
lators Selstad, Keller and T. L. Murphy.77 The resolution provided for
single and dual-member districts instead of the present multi-member
districts that exist in the larger counties of the state. This resolution
was killed in the Reapportionment Committee on February 10, 1971. The
second Joint Resolution, No. 48, was introduced by the Reapportion-
ment Committee. This resolution stated that a bipartisan reapportion-
ment commission should be established to present plans to the legis-
lative assembly on solutions to Montana's reapportionment problems
and methods to reapportion the legislative districts. This resolution was
killed during the second reading which took place on February 12, 1971.
The third and final joint senate and house resolution was introduced
by the Reapportionment Committee. This resolution, which was Joint
Resolution No. 24, provided for certain guidelines to be followed in
'
7 Tom Selstad (Rep.-Cascade County), Terry L. Murphy (Dem.-Jefferson County),
and M. F. Keller (Rep.-Cascade County).
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reapportioning the Montana Legislature.78 This resolution was killed
on March 1, 1971.
On March 4, 1971, the regular session of the 42nd Legislative
Assembly adjourned without having reapportioned itself, and on March
8, 1971, the 42nd Legislative Assembly began the first of two extra-
ordinary sessions. Reapportionment had by now reached the forefront
of the problems that faced the Assembly. Finally, on March 10, 1971,
the Reapportionment Committee approved Extraordinary Senate Bill
No. 1. This bill provided for a senate of 56 members and a house of
representatives that was to be composed of 104 members. This bill was
passed by the Montana legislature and was signed into law on April
6, 1971, by Governor Forrest Anderson. A suit was immediately filed
to test the constitutional validity of this reapportionment.79
On June 11, 1971, a three-judge court sitting in Billings, Montana,
ruled the reapportionment plan of the 42nd Legislative Assembly to be
unconstitutional. The court did not believe that a deviation of 37.06
percent between the smallest and largest house districts and a deviation
of 23 percent between the smallest and largest senate districts was
constitutionally acceptable. The court stated:
It is clear from the record that in drafting Chapter Ex-3 (Extra-
ordinary Senate Bill No. 1 which was enacted into law) the Montana
legislature took the maximum deviation reflected in the Herweg
decision as the acceptable standard and devised a plan within
those limits which resulted in the least possible change from the
'The 42nd Legislature was unable to agree on these general guidelines: That the
senate shall consist of not less than forty (40) members; not more than fifty (50)
members, and that the senate districts may be single-member or multi-member dis-
tricts, and that the house of representatives shall consist of not less than eighty (80)
members nor more than one hundred (100) members, and that the members of the
House of Representatives shall be elected from single-member districts or multi-
member districts, and that to the extent practicable, districts for election house
members should be created from portions of senate districts, and that districts shall
be compact, comprise contiguous territory, and that county boundaries should be
observed to the extent practicable, and that multi-member districts shall be divided
into single-member districts under the following conditions: (a) A petition repre-
senting eight (8) percent of the registered voters of a multi-member district has
been submitted to the county clerk and recorder of each county, or portion of a
county, in the district; (b) The county commissioners of each county which, in part
or whole, consists of a portion of a multi-member district shall establish a time of
election; (c) A majority of the registered voters of the districts so orders; (d) The
plan of single-member districts shall be effective upon the approval of the majority
of the county commissioners of each county which, in part or whole, consists of a
portion of the multi-member district; (e) Single-member districts shall be compact,
comprise contiguous territory and shall be as nearly equal as practicable in population.7 Wold v. Anderson, Governor of the State of Mont. 28 Mont. St. Rep. 585, 586,
327 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mont. 1971). The Court stated: "By decree entered August 10,
1965, in the case of Herweg v. the Thirty-ninth Legislative Assembly of the State of
Montana, 246 F. Supp. 454, this Court ordered into effect a plan for the apportionment
of members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Montana Legislative
Assembly for the 1966 election, retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of passing
upon any plan of reapportionment enacted by the Fortieth Legislative Assembly."
No appeal was taken from the plan contained in Herweg (Ch. 194, L. 1967, R.C.M.
43-106.1 and 106.2) and members of the Montana Legislative Assembly were elected
pursuant to this plan in 1968 and 1970.
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status quo. But the equal protection clause of the Constitution, not
Herweg provides the standard to which the Legislature must as-
pire.'
The court also stated that since the 42nd Montana Legislative Assembly
was still in the second extraordinary session that: "We reserve juris-
diction to make such order as may be appropriate following such
session."8'
The result of this court's decision was to return the reapportion-
ment issue to the 42nd Montana Legislature, which had entered into the
second of two extraordinary sessions. A compromise bill,82 which was a
variation of the previously unacceptable reapportion plans that had
been drafted by the Senate and House reapportionment committees,
8 3
was presented. This new plan was subdivided into four subsections.
The first two subsections8 4 reduced the legislature from 55 senators
and 104 representatives to 50 senators and 100 representatives. The
county boundaries of Carter, Sweet Grass, Valley, Yellowstone and Mis-
soula were changed to form 23 legislative districts. The second part
of this plan provided for multi-member districts to subdivide them-
selves into single-member districts.8 5 Eight percent of the registered
voters would file a petition demanding that a general election be held
to determine whether the legislative district should be subdivided into
single-member districts. If the majority of the voters at such an elec-
tion agree to subdivide the legislative district, then the county com-
missioners of the affected counties shall divide the multi-member dis-
trict into single-member districts. The third portion of this bill provided
for the adjustment of senatorial terms.8 6 The result of this was that
hold-over senators from districts which remain essentially unchanged
would not have to seek re-election in 1972. The amendment would
save 14 senators elected last year from having to run before their terms
expire. This bill passed the House of Representatives on June 23rd
by a vote of 51-34, and the bill passed the Senate on June 24th by a
42-3 vote. The 42nd Session of the Montana Legislature adjourned at
the end of June, and questions immediately arose as to whether or not
this compromise reapportioned plan fulfilled the U.S. Constitutional
requirements that were set forth in the various Supreme Court deci-
sions. The whole issue of whether the new law complied with the
constitutional requirements hinged on the fact that the new reapportion-




"Extraordinary Session II, H.R. Bill No. 40.
8See, supra notes 68-80, for previously unacceptable reapportionment plans that had
been submitted to the previous sessions of the Montana Legislature.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 43-106.6, n. 43-106.7.
R.C.M. 1947, § 43-106.8.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 43-106.9.
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On July 3, 1971, Russell K. Fillner, a Billings attorney, asked a
three-judge U.S. District Court panel to review the new reapportion-
ment which the 42nd Legislative Assembly had enacted. This court,
which had ruled the first reapportionment plan unconstitutional 8 7 stated
on June 11, 1971:
We take judicial notice of the fact that the Montana legislative
assembly is now in extraordinary session. We reserve jurisdiction[over the reapportionment issue] to make such orders as may be
appropriate following such session.'
Both Senate Majority Leader Dick Dzivi of Great Falls and Senator
Neil J. Lynch, D-Butte, consider the present reapportionment plan to
be a constitutionally acceptable attempt to reapportion the Montana
Legislature, and both filed supporting affidavits. The State of Montana
maintains that the law is constitutional, and briefs were filed to this
effect by Charles H. Dickman and Charles C. Lovell for the Montana
Attorney General's Office.
Fillner, in his brief, argues that the legislature aimed not for dis-
tricts that are as equal as possible but merely districts which deviate
from each other in population by no more than 10 percent. Fillner also
argues that the present law is unconstitutional because the districts
created are not as equal in population as those proposed in other bills.
Fillner contends that the present plan was subjected to political gerry-
mandering in several counties to save the seats of incumbent legislators.
The final decision will have been made by the three-judge court by
the time this comment has been published.
A REAPPORTIONMENT PROPOSAL TO THE
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Reapportionment will always be one of the main problems of which
Montana legislatures, as well as the legislative assemblies of other
states, must be cognizant. One of the simplest and quickest ways to solve
any reapportionment problem is to do nothing and then let the courts,
federal and state, reapportion the legislative assemblies. Legislators are
understandably hostile to this solution, and to some extent justifiably
so. Courts do not consider, nor should they be expected to, the various
geographical, social, historical, and other such interest groups that make
up the character of the citizenry of a state. Legislators, who represent
in varying degrees these political groups, are aware of this competing
interest of citizens. Legislators should be the men who reapportion the
legislature, and courts should only step into the picture when the legis-
lature either fails to reapportion or malapportions the assembly giving
more weight to one set of citizens' interests than that group justifiably
deserves. Montana does have a method by which the legislature can
reapportion itself; it should be written into the new Constitution. Pro-
Wold v. Anderson, supra note 79.
'Wold v. Anderson, supra note 79 at 588:
1971]
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posals89 were introduced during the 42nd Legislative Assembly that
with some slight modification can be written into the new constitution
to provide a solution to Montana's reapportionment woes. The follow-
ing is the author's reapportionment proposal for the new constitution.
ARTICLE: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
APPORTIONMENT
Sec. 1 Senatorial. The Montana Legislative Assembly shall re-
district the state after each federal census for the purpose of elect-
ing state senators. All senatorial districts shall be formed of con-
tiguous and compact territory. In their formation, area shall be
the prime consideration. All districts shall be as equal as practic-
able in population.
Sec. 2 Representative. The Montana Legislative Assembly shall
redistrict the state after each federal census for the purpose of
electing state representatives. Representative districts shall be
formed of continguous and compact territory. All districts shall be
as equal as practicable in population.
Sec. 3 Population. Population shall be determined by each federal
census.
These are standard phrases used by most state constitutions," and
no specific mention is made of whether or not Montana should be com-
posed of single, dual, or multi-member districts. We have already noted
the arguments "pro" and "con" for each systemf1 The author's personal
opinion would be that "single" member districts are much easier to
deal with and provide easier bases from which to reapportion. Montana
legislators, and Montana citizens, appear to have a strong affection for
the 56 individual counties, and single-member districts would cut across
and through many individual counties. On the other hand, multi-member
districts would preserve, to some extent at least, the individual county
lines. At present, Montana has a combination of both. The larger
counties such as Cascade, Yellowstone, and Silver Bow are represented
by several legislators. The smaller counties or groups of counties are
only represented by one legislator. If the new constitution does not in-
corporate a mandate for a particular mode of redistricting, the future
Montana legislative assemblies will be free to choose the type of system
that would best represent Montana.
In regard to the definition of "population" the author can see no
sound policy for excluding foreign aliens,92 Indians non-taxable, 93 or
servicemen on active duty.9 4 This is a policy judgment based on two
basic principles. All persons domiciled in a district are entitled to rep-
resentation. These people purchase gasoline, alcoholic beverages, tobac-
co products, and other such taxable items; therefore, they should be
9H.R. Bill No. 601 and H.R.J. Res. 48, supra note 77.
wThe constitution that Montana presently follows for these provisions is that of Illi-
nois. ILL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 6-7.
'Waldron, supra note 73.
"2Ms. CONsT. art. IV, p. 1, 2 and Pt. III; NEn. CONST. art. III, § 5; N.Y. CoIsT. art. 3,
§4-5; CA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; and N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 4-6.
-MININ. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 23; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 4-6; WASH. CONST. art. II, §
3; and WIs, CoNsT. art. IV, § 3.
"WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3 and Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
[Vol. 33
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given representation as to how their tax dollar is to be spent by the
government. This argument is strengthened in states with a sales tax.
The second principle, which is of lesser importance because computers
often do most of the work, is that economic savings will result: The
census bureau will not have to waste the necessary time and money
auditing federal census returns to discover who is an "exception" to
the population figures.
Sec. 4 Reapportioament. At each legislative assembly, after the
taking of each federal census, the Montana Legislature shall re-
district and reapportion itself in a single legislative enactment. If
however, after the thirtieth (30) business day from the start of the
legislative session, the legislators fail to redistrict and reapportion
itself then the redistricting shall be accomplished by a commission."
This section would give to the legislature the chance to draft a
new reapportionment plan. The thirty-day time limit should provide
adequate time for such a plan to be drafted, revised and adopted. If
the legislature either cannot or will not reach a reapportionment agree-
ment, then the burden of redistricting should fall upon a commission.
The important feature of this plan is that the legislature is forced to
act immediately.
Sec. 5 Reapportionment Commission. Within 15 days, after the
thirtieth (30) business day of the legislative assembly, the state
central committee of each of the two political parties casting the
highest votes for governor at the last preceding gubernatorial
election, shall submit to the governor of the state a list of ten per-
sons. Within thirty days thereafter, the governor shall appoint the
commission of ten members, five from each list. If either of the
state central committees fails to submit the list within the specified
time, the governor, within the specified time, shall appoint five
members of his own choice from the party of such committee.
This commission shall redistrict the state into senatorial districts
and into representative districts in the manner specified. This com-
mission shall file with the secretary of state a full statement of the
numbers of the senatorial and representative districts and their
boundaries. No such statement shall be valid unless approved by
seven members of such commission."
This section provides for the two major parties in the state to be
represented on the reapportionment commission, and the parties are
able to select their best partisan negotiators for this task. The governor
has the final choice in selection of this commission. The governor has
been selected by a majority vote, or perhaps a plurality, of the voters
of the state. Because of these factors, the governor should be the one
to have the final choice. One must always be cognizant of the possibility
that the Montana Supreme Court will have to make a decision on the
constitutional validity of any reapportionment plan, making it necessary
to refrain from involving any member of the Supreme Court in the
formation of a plan. This section requires a seven-vote majority on any
reapportionment decision, so that any new reapportionment plan must
obtain more than a mere majority vote of the members of the com-
'This provision is also found in the constitution of Illinois and Missouri. ILL. CONST.
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mission, insuring that the redistricting will be acceptable to both major
parties. A financial reimbursement provision for commission members
should be enacted through enabling legislation.
Sec. 6 Failure of Reapportionment Commission. If a majority of
the commission cannot agree on a plan each member of the com-
mission individually or jointly with other members must submit a
proposed plan to the supreme court. The supreme court shall deter-
mine which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional
requirements and shall direct that it be adopted by the commission
and published as provided in these sections.
Upon the application of any elector or commission member filed not
later than 60 days after final publication of the plan, the supreme
court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction, shall direct the secre-
tary of state or the commission to perform their duties, may review
any final plan adopted by the commission, and shall remand such
plan to the commission for further action if it fails to comply with
the requirements of the Montana or United States Constitution.
This section would guarantee to Montana a reapportionment plan
even if the commission were unable to agree on how to redistrict the
state. The commission, even if not in agreement, would be forced to
submit considered plans to the Montana Supreme Court, which would
be the final judge or arbitrator of the plans. These justices, who are
citizens of Montana, would be able to appreciate and to understand
the state's particular reapportionment difficulties. Since the supreme
court is nonpartisan in nature, the justices should be able to reach an
equitable and nonpartisan solution.97
The second paragraph of this section gives any Montana elector
or commission member the requisite standing to contest the validity of the
adopted reapportionment plan. The Montana Supreme Court is given
original jurisdiction to hear the suit.9 8 The Supreme Court is also given
the power to compel the commission to act, or the court may remand
the reapportionment plan to the commission in order to obtain a new
or revised plan if the court believes that the present plan is unconstitu-
tional. The 60-day provision merely guarantees that any suit will be
brought in a timely and efficient manner. Needless to say, any elector,
at any time, has the requisite standing to challenge any reapportion-
ment plan by taking his suit before the federal courts.99
The rationale of this proposed plan is speed and efficiency. The
time span from the start of the legislative session to a final judicial
decision of the reapportionment plan would be approximately six months.
Because the states that have adopted this type of provision have not
had a chance to apply the new plans to the 1970 census, its actual oper-
ation is yet untested.
KMIcH. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
9Original jurisdiction allows the Montana Supreme Court to be the sole and exclusive
authority to hear and to decide the case. This means that a suit, which falls within
this category, will come directly in front of the Supreme Court without the necessity
of climbing the ladder of appeals. This also means that the Montana Supreme Court
must hear and pass judgment on the case in question and is the only court which
has the authority to do so.0 Colegrove v. Green, supra note 13, and Baker v. Carr, supra note 30.
[Vol. 33
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 33 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/6
1971] APPORTIONMENT: PAST TO FUTURE 125
CONCLUSION
The reapportionment issue has evolved from a moot question into
one of the most controversial and important problems facing almost
every state. Reapportionment has cut across the whole spectrum of our
judicial, social, political and historical environment. Montana has been
no exception, and this state has been forced to reapportion itself, often
through the process of trial and error, by the judicial system. Adoption
of the proposal offered in this comment will resolve many of the reap-
portionment problems that have and may well continue to plague Mon-
tana.
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